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Abstract
We provide theoretical and empirical evidence on the evolution and impact of
non-practicing entities (NPEs) in the intellectual property space. Heterogeneity in
innovation, given a cost of commercialization, results in NPEs that choose to act as
\patent trolls" that chase operating rms' innovations even if those innovations are not
clearly infringing on the NPEs' patents. We support these predictions using a novel,
large dataset of patents targeted by NPEs. We show that NPEs on average target rms
that are ush with cash (or have just had large positive cash shocks). Furthermore,
NPEs target rm prots arising from exogenous cash shocks unrelated to the allegedly
infringing patents. We next show that NPEs target rms irrespective of the closeness of
those rms' patents to the NPEs', and that NPEs typically target rms that are busy
with other (non-IP related) lawsuits or are likely to settle. Lastly, we show that NPE
litigation has a negative real impact on the future innovative activity of targeted rms.
JEL Classication: D2, K1, O31.
Keywords: Patent trolls, NPEs, Innovation, Patents.Clearly dened property rights are essential for well-functioning markets. In the case of
intellectual property (IP), however, property rights are complex to dene; unlike ownership
of physical assets, the space of ideas is dicult to clearly delineate. A solution employed
by the United States and many other countries is the patent|a property right allowing an
idea's owner sole commercialization rights for a period of time. A patent holder can therefore
block commercialization of inventions arguably similar to the patented invention. In the
United States, the legal system is the arbiter of patent infringement; thus, legal action (or the
threat of legal action) is the main lever by which patent holders challenge alleged intellectual
property infringers.
A new organizational form, the non-practicing entity (hereafter, NPE), has recently
emerged as a major driver of IP litigation. NPEs amass patents not for the sake of producing
commercial products, but in order to prosecute infringement on their patent portfolios. The
rise of NPEs has sparked a debate regarding their value and their impact on innovation.
Proponents argue that imperfections in the legal system implicitly reward large, well-funded
organizations, enabling them to infringe at will on small innovators' IP and that NPEs are
there to protect small innovators from such abuse. Opponents cast NPEs as organizations
that simply raise the costs of innovation by exploiting the fact that an imperfect legal system
will rule in their favor suciently often|even if no infringement has actually occurred|that
the credible threat of the legal process can yield rents from producing, innovative rms.1
Reecting this debate, there have been (as of today) at least ten bills introduced in Congress
proposing to regulate the licensing of patents to NPEs.2
We inform the ongoing debate on NPEs by providing the rst large-sample evidence on
precisely which corporations NPEs target in litigation, when NPE litigation occurs, and
1Bessen et al. (2011) estimate that from 2007 to 2010, these litigation (and settlement) losses averaged
over $83 billion per year in 2010 dollars (just summing over the losses to publicly traded rms). This is
equivalent to over 25% of annual United States industrial R&D investment.
2In the last four years, Congress has considered the Innovation Act (H.R. 3309), the Patent Transparency
and Improvements Act (S. 1720), the Patent Quality Improvement Act (S. 866), the Patent Abuse Reduction
Act (S. 1013), the Patent Litigation Integrity Act (S. 1612), the Innovation Protection Act (H.R. 3309), the
Patent Litigation and Innovation Act (H.R. 2639), the SHIELD Act (H.R. 845), the Stopping the Oensive
Use of Patents Act (STOP Act) (H.R. 2766), and the End Anonymous Patents Act (H.R. 2024).
1the impact of NPE litigation on the targeted rms' innovative activity. We rst develop a
parsimonious model of an innovative economy in which NPEs endogenously arise as patent
trolls|agents that sue opportunistically in hopes that an imperfect legal system will rule in
their favor, maximizing expected proceeds rather than maximizing penalties to infringement
behavior. We assume heterogeneity in innovation quality across agents. This heterogeneity,
together with a cost of commercialization and a litigation mechanism that imperfectly enforces
infringement, leads some patent holders to endogenously decide to litigate commercializing
rms instead of commercializing their own inventions. This decision depends on a comparison
of the expected protability of litigation to the expected protability of commercialization.
Low-type innovators will nearly always litigate. Furthermore, especially high-type innovators
will commercialize, but will be litigated often: Even if the high-type's patent portfolio is
dissimilar to the low-type's (so the litigation's probability of success is low), the potential
payo of litigation could be high enough to induce suit. Thus, our model predicts that
targeted rms should be those cash-rich enough to fund payos and those most likely to
settle or lose the case for any reason (even if they have less cash).
An interesting implication of the model is that the endogenous emergence of patent trolls
causes socially inecient outcomes by ensuring that some welfare-increasing innovations are
not brought to market. These social losses come from two sources: rst, from innovators
with protably commercializable inventions but with a high enough probability of being sued
to be deterred from production; second, from innovators that decide not to commercialize
because the ex ante expected protability of becoming a patent troll is higher than that of
commercialization.
Using proprietary data, we provide strong empirical evidence for the model's main
predictions. We link patent-level data on NPEs and their activities to data on all publicly
traded rms. Using this linked data, we show that NPEs behave opportunistically; that is,
typically acting as patent trolls. Specically: NPEs target rms that are ush with cash
(controlling for all other characteristics) and rms that have had recent, positive cash shocks.
2Indeed, a one standard-deviation increase in cash level increases the probability of being sued
by an NPE by 11% (t = 6:84). Given that the mean probability is 2%, this is more than a
vefold increase.
In fact, NPEs even target conglomerate rms that earn all of their cash from segments
having nothing to do with the allegedly infringing patents. For example, an NPE is likely sue
a rm regarding a technology patent even if the rm is earning all its revenue from a lumber
division entirely unrelated to the allegedly infringing technology patent|even if the division
holding that patent is unprotable. Indeed, we nd that protability in unrelated businesses
is almost as predictive of NPE infringement lawsuits as is protability in the segment related
to the allegedly infringing patent.
Consistent with our model, we also nd that NPEs target rms against which they have
a higher ex ante likelihood of winning. We demonstrate this fact using multiple measures of
ex ante likelihood of lawsuit success. First, we show that NPEs are signicantly more likely
to target rms that are busy dealing with a number of other litigation events unrelated to
intellectual property. Being tied up with outside litigation roughly doubles the probability
(t = 2:87) of being sued by an NPE. Moreover, we show that, controlling for all other
characteristics, rms with larger legal teams have a signicantly lower probability of being
targeted by NPEs, consistent with large legal teams serving as a deterrent.
Of course, the true prediction of our model is on the ex ante expected protability
of NPE litigation. To capture this, we interact our measures of expected cash payouts
with our measures of expected lawsuit success. We nd that, as the model predicts, NPEs
systematically target those rms for which the ex ante expected protability of litigation is
large. In particular, the payoutprobability interaction terms are signicant and economically
large. Our nding suggests that nearly all the rms targeted by NPEs have large pools of
cash for potential payouts and are ex ante more likely to pay o in some form (either an
out-of-court settlement or an in-court loss). To further explore this connection, we construct a
measure of the ex ante expected outcome if a targeted rm were to go to court. This measure
3relies on the assumption that defendants often make predictions about the likely outcome
based on observations of other rms in the same industry and location. We nd that the
interaction term of this expected outcome and expected payout is again large and signicant,
providing further evidence that NPEs choose targets based on expected protability: suits
with high probability of payo against rms with deep pockets.
Non-practicing entities don't have a monopoly on IP litigation. Practicing entities (PEs),
such as IBM and Intel, also sue each other for patent infringement. If our results are simply
picking up general characteristics of IP litigation, then we might expect to see PEs behaving in
much the same way as NPEs. In order to compare PE and NPE behavior, we hand-collected
the universe of patent infringement cases brought by PEs against other PEs in the same
period (2001{2011). However, we nd the opposite. If anything, PEs are slightly less likely to
sue rms with high cash balances and less likely to sue rms with many ongoing cases. All of
the other determinants of NPE targeting have (statistically and economically) no impact on
PE litigation behavior. This comparison suggests that our results on NPE litigation behavior
are not just reections of general characteristics of IP litigation. Rather, our ndings are
consistent with agent-specic motivations for NPEs in targeting rms ush with cash just
when favorable legal outcomes are more likely.
Lastly, we examine the real impacts of NPEs' litigation activity. Comparing rms that are
sued by NPEs and go to court (and in this way controlling for selection of rms targeted by
NPEs), we nd that rms that lose in court have signicantly lower post-litigation patenting
activity and fewer citations to their marginal post-litigation patents, relative to rms whose
cases are dismissed. Furthermore, after losing to NPEs, rms signicantly reduce R&D
spending|both projects inside the rm and acquiring innovative R&D projects outside the
rm. Our evidence suggests that it really is the NPE litigation event that causes this decrease
in innovation.3 Prior to litigation, rms that subsequently lose to NPEs are identical to those
3Of course, when NPEs win suits, some of the losses to the practicing entity|that is, the awarded
damages but not the legal costs|will go back to the NPEs. Potentially, those funds could ow back to
the end-innovators, fueling further invention. Estimates are, however, that only ve cents of every dollar in
damages won by NPEs actually is paid back to innovators (Bessen and Meurer, 2014).
4that subsequently have suits dismissed. They have the same R&D, patenting, and patent
quality. Moreover, patents of rms developed pre-litigation continue to accrue citations at
exactly the same rate after litigation, whether or not the suit was dismissed. This is in stark
contrast to the divergent amount of citations of rms' post-litigation patents.
Taken as a whole, our evidence appears most consistent with the view that NPEs behave
as patent trolls. Alternative interpretations simply do not seem to explain our entire body
of evidence. For instance, the possibility that targeted rms know they are infringing and
therefore raise cash against anticipated litigation might be consistent with our results on
cash-targeting; however, this view is completely at odds with our nding that rms that
signicantly reduce their legal representation are NPEs' main targets. Meanwhile, the idea
that NPEs solely target rms that protability infringe on NPE intellectual property is largely
inconsistent with our nding that protability in unrelated operating segments is almost as
predictive of suit as protability in the targeted patents' segments.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 provides background and
a literature review. Section 2 develops a model of the economics of innovation and the
endogenous evolution of patent trolls. Section 3 describes the proprietary data that we use.
Section 4 presents the main empirical results on NPE targeting. Section 5 shows evidence on
the real impacts of NPE litigation behavior on innovation. Section 6 provides a discussion,
and Section 7 concludes.
1 Background
The amount of patent-related litigation has increased tenfold since 2000. According to a recent
Government Accounting Oce (2013) report, three factors contributed to this pattern: (1)
the number of patents (especially software-related patents) with unclear scope has increased;
(2) courts have been awarding large monetary awards in infringement lawsuits, even for ideas
that make only small contributions to a product; and (3) markets place a larger valuation on
5patents than they did before.
Large-scale NPE patent litigation is a recent development; thus, the empirical literature on
NPEs is limited, but growing rapidly (see Bessen et al., 2011; Galasso et al., 2013; Bessen and
Meurer, 2014; Chien, 2014; Scott Morton and Shapiro, 2014; Smeets 2014; Tucker 2014a,b).
Our paper contributes to this literature by providing facts about which public corporations
NPEs choose litigate, when NPEs litigate those companies, and how NPE litigation impacts
innovative activity at targeted rms.
Our work is also related to the literature that examines the choice between settlement and
the pursuit of a court decision. Spier (2005) provides an excellent review of the economics of
litigation. Previous surveys include those of Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989), Hay and Spier
(1998), and Daughety (2000). While we focus solely on intellectual property, our paper is
also related to the well-developed literature on the eect of litigation risk on rm activities.4
2 Economics of Innovation and Litigation
In this section, we present a simple model of innovation commercialization in the shadow of
(possible) patent trolling.
Our model illustrates our main empirical predictions: NPEs' lawsuit targeting decisions
depend directly on expected protability of suit, rather than the similarity of targets'
inventions to the those of the NPEs. NPEs target the most protable rms. Meanwhile,
NPEs ignore rms with inventions closely to their own because those inventions are not
protable enough to justify suit.
Additionally, our model complements our empirical analysis by highlighting two sources
4Prior research has investigated the impact of litigation risk on several characteristics, including cash hold-
ings (Arena and Julio, 2010), equity-based compensation (Jayaraman and Milbourn, 2009), IPO underpricing
(Lowry and Shu, 2002; Hanley and Hoberg, 2012), institutional monitoring and board discipline (Cheng,
Huang, Li, and Lobo, 2010; Laux, 2010), conservatism in debt contracting (Beatty, Weber, and Yu, 2008),
audit fees (Seetharaman, Gul, and Lynn, 2002), and auditors' resignation decisions (Shu, 2000). Papers have
also investigated the relationship between managers' nancial reporting and disclosure decisions and rms'
litigation risk (see, e.g., Skinner 1994, 1997; Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper, 1994; Johnson, Kasznik, and
Nelson, 2000; Rogers and Van Buskirk, 2009).
6of ineciency from patent trolling:
 Because of patent trolling, innovations of intermediate quality (too low to be unam-
biguously commercializable, but too high to be \safe" from trolls) are crowded out of
the market entirely.
 Innovators may forgo commercialization in favor of trolling.
In our presentation of the model, we abstract away from innovation production by assuming
that inventors i are already endowed with inventions of quality i. However, our ndings are
unchanged if we (1) treat i as the expected quality of innovator i's invention conditional on
innovation attempt, and (2) incorporate the costs of innovation into the cost of invention
commercialization (k, in the sequel). Thus, our nding on commercialization crowd-out can
be interpreted equally well as crowding out of innovative activity.5
2.1 Basic Model
We consider a simple setup in which there are two inventors.6 Each inventor i has an invention
i 2 R and can choose between commercializing, suing, or exit.7
Commercializing an invention  yields prots (), at (xed) cost k. We assume that
inventions are ordered by quality so that  is increasing.8
Suing costs c. If one inventor sues and the other commercializes, then the suing inventor
wins his suit with probability pi(j)  p(ji jj). We assume p is continuous, and that suits
5We also abstract away from the fact that, often, NPEs are not themselves inventors. This does not
meaningfully aect our theoretical ndings, as the cost of acquiring patents can be incorporated into the
cost of suit (c, in the sequel). However, treating NPEs as inventors does mask a third potential source of
ineciency from patent trolling: if NPEs keep some of the proceeds from their lawsuits rather than passing
them through to end inventors, then they can ineciently distort funds away from innovation. We discuss
this ineciency|and try to ballpark its magnitude|in Section 6.
6Our approach can be easily extended to a continuum of investors, but all of the important dynamics can
be illustrated with the two-inventor case.
7We focus only on pure-strategy equilibria. Additionally, we assume that rms cannot commit not to sue.
8We treat invention types as unidimensional, eectively focusing on a single category of invention with
dierentiation only in terms of quality. Our results are unchanged if instead we allow both horizontal and
vertical dierentiation. Indeed, our results are strengthened if courts may sometimes make errors on the
horizontal dimension of innovation, as then inventors holding patents in low-value invention categories can
bring patent troll lawsuits against rms that have inventions in higher-value categories.
7over identical inventions are always successful, i.e. p(0) = 1. In principle, distinct inventions
should never be determined infringing|fully eective courts would ensure that p() = 0 for
all  6= 0. However, we assume some friction in courts' evaluations of patent similarity, so
that p() > 0 for all  2 R. Nevertheless, we assume that courts can make relative similarity
judgments correctly, so that p is decreasing.
If an inventor i wins a suit against the other inventor, j, then i is awarded !((j)). Here,
we assume that ! 2 (0;1), so that we express the award as a multiple ! of the commercial
prots (j). For example, in the case of \trebled" damages, with damages determined equal
to the commercial prots (j) of j, we would have ! = 3. Suing yields no prots if both
inventors choose to sue, or if one inventor chooses to exit.
2.2 The Born Troll
First, we consider the case in which one of the inventors, t is a \born troll," whose invention
is not valuable enough to commercialize on its own. That is, we assume that (t) < k. In
this case, t will always choose either to sue or to exit. In this context, the other inventor,
r 6= t, will never choose to sue.
We suppose that r 6= t has a potentially protable invention: (r)  k, or equivalently,
r >  1 (k). We then have t <  1 (k) < r, so that pt(r) is decreasing in r. There are
three cases to consider:
1. If r <  1

c
!pt(r)

, then !((r))  pt(r) < c, so that suit is never protable for t.
In this case, r can commercialize without fear of suit, and will choose to do so.9
2. If  1

c
!pt(r)

< r and r <  1

k
1 !pt(r)

, then c < !((r))  pt(r)|suit is
protable|and (r)   k < !((r))pt(r)|commercialization is not protable for t,
9The range of inventions r which are commercialized without drawing suit expands, holding p xed, as
 the cost of commercialization, k, falls;
 the cost of suit, c, rises; or
 the returns from suit ! fall.
8given that i gets sued. In this case, inventor r has a protable invention but chooses
not to commercialize; this is socially inecient(!).10
3. If  1

c
!pt(r)

< r and  1

k
1 !pt(r)

< r, then c < !((r))  pt(r)|suit is
protable|and !((r))pt(r) < (r)   k|commercialization is protable for t even
given suit. In this case, r will choose to commercialize, and t will sue him.
If !pt(r)  1, then r <  1

k
1 !pt(r)

a priori, so commercializing cannot be protable
in the presence of suit. Thus, we assume !pt(r) < 1 in the sequel.
Now, suit occurs in equilibrium if and only if
r > max


 1

c
!pt(r)

;
 1

k
1   !pt(r)

> 
 1 (k): (1)
Thus, there is a range of inventions r for which
t < 
 1 (k) < r < max


 1

c
!pt(r)

;
 1

k
1   !pt(r)

: (2)
Any inventions r in the range (2) for which r <  1

c
!pt(r)

|that is, any inventions
r for which r > p
 1
t
 
1
!
c
k

|are commercialized (case 1 above). There are commercialized
inventions that do not draw suit even though they are \closer" to t than the inventions that
do draw suit. Because t is a low-value invention, the inventions most similar to t are not
worth trolling.
Now, as c ! 0, the  1

k
1 !pt(r)

< r condition must bind in (1). Thus for any
suciently valuable invention that is commercialized|no matter how unlikely to be confused
with t|it is possible to make the costs of suit c low enough that t will sue r.
An increase in !pt(r) towards 1 increases crowd-out on both the low and high margins:
The range of inventions r for which r <  1

c
!pt(r)

shrinks, so fewer inventions can
10Note that this result is preserved even if we allow mixed strategies. Indeed, if r can mix between suing
and exiting, then he will sue just frequently enough to ensure that r is indierent between commercializing
and not commercializing.
9be commercialized without fear of suit. Meanwhile, the range of inventions r for which
 1

k
1 !pt(r)

< r also shrinks|inventions that were previously protable (given suit)
become unprotable (given suit). Thus, increases in !, the returns from suit, and pointwise
dominant increases (i.e. rightward shifts) in pt(), the probability of successful suit, are
socially inecient. It is not clear, however, that such shifts will produce more suits in
aggregate because inventions that might have drawn suit are crowded-out.
2.3 The Opportunistic Inventor
Now, we suppose that both inventors have potentially protable inventions, but that one of
the inventors, t, has an much less valuable than that of the other inventor, r. We focus on
one particular region of interest, in which t chooses not to commercialize and instead sues r.
Specically, we assume:
 r > t >  1 (k) (both inventions are potentially protable);
 (r) k !((r))pt(r) > maxf!((t))pr(t) c;0g = maxf!((t))pt(r) c;0g
(commercialization is the most protable option for r, even given the possibility of suit
and the option of suing t); and
 !((r))pt(r)   c > (t)   k (if r commercializes, then suing is unambiguously the
most protable option for t).
With these assumptions, r always commercializes and t always sues r instead of commercial-
izing. Even though t has a socially valuable invention, the high expected returns from suing
a much more protable inventor lead t to become an \endogenous troll."
103 Data
We obtain information on NPEs from PatentFreedom, a company that tabulates information
on NPE behavior, including data on patent litigation.11 PatentFreedom has collected data
going back to 1977, capturing from Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER)
every litigation led by more than 4000 NPEs (approximately 850 parent companies, and 3300
aliates); the data is thus systematic, and not based on self-reporting. PatentFreedom cleans
its raw ling data (for instance, removing some \administrative duplicates" representing the
same case, but moved across districts).
Patent assertions by NPEs (e.g., \demand letters"), while not formal legal actions, do
occur. Patent assertions are unreported by nature, so there is unfortunately no comprehensive
dataset of these actions. However, it is widely believed that informal patent assertions has
been in decline recently, and is projected to decline further. The two biggest factors driving
this decline are the decreasing credibility of patent assertion (given the availability of formal
legal channel),12 and the rise of legislation (both state and federal) to hold entities liable
for unsubstantiated demand letters.13 Furthermore, as many more NPEs are now suing (see
Table I), non-legally binding letters simply claiming infringement (and asking for money) are
becoming less credible signals. The equilibrium result is that the economically large alleged
IP infringements appear to be addressed through lawsuits (all of which in our data), and
this is becoming increasingly true over time. We thus feel that PatentFreedom's systematic
and exhaustive collection of NPE lawsuit data likely captures an important, economically
important (and increasingly dominant) component of NPE behavior, even though it does not
fully capture patent assertions (which, again, appear to be on the decline).
11PatentFreedom denes an NPE as \A rm that derives the majority of its revenue from licensing and
enforcement of patents." Under this denition, traditional legal entities established to license and enforce
patents encompass the majority of NPEs. Additionally, individual inventors may be counted, while universities
will not be counted (unless they have enforcement subsidiaries).
12One company executive relayed to us his reply to NPEs that send demand letters: \If you have a truly
viable case you will sue; otherwise don't waste my time with this letter(!)."
13See, e.g., Executive Oce of the President 2013 report on Patent Assertion and U.S. Innovation, http:
//www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf (accessed on March 5, 2014).
11According to PatentFreedom, roughly 69% of NPEs patents were acquired externally
(purchased) by the NPEs and their subsidiaries, whereas 19% were originally assigned to
them.14 The data also provide detailed information on 11,838 litigations, again which
PatentFreedom obtained from the Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER)
database. In 10,933 of these cases, an NPE was the plainti. We focus on the 3,683 cases in
which the defendant rm was publicly traded.
We obtain rm-level patent information from the database used by Kogan et al. (2012).15
This database contains utility patents issued by the United States Patent and Trademark
Oce (USPTO) between January 1, 1926 and November 2, 2010, along with citation data
on those patents.16 We obtain information on the in-house legal counsels and law rm
associations of public rms from ALM Legal Intelligence, which searches public records to
nd outside counsel used by companies for corporate, contract, labor, tort, and IP litigation.
To identify involvement in litigation events not related to IP, we use the Audit Analytics
Litigation database, which covers the period from 2000 to 2012 and reports information on
litigation for Russell 1000 rms from legal disclosures led with the SEC. Audit Analytics
collects details related to specic litigation, including the original dates of ling and locations
of litigation; information on plaintis, defendants, and judges; and, if available, the original
claim amounts and the settlement amounts.
In Table I (Panel A), we present summary statistics on the rms included in our analysis.17
Consistent with the overall trend that the amount of patent litigation has increased over
time, we nd that the number of public rms sued by NPEs has increased over time (see
14See https://www.patentfreedom.com/about-npes/background/ (accessed on March 5, 2014). The
remaining 12% are a blend of originally assigned and acquired patents.
15We thank Leonid Kogan, Amit Seru, Noah Stoman and Dimitris Papanikolaou for providing both patent
and citation data.
16USPTO denes utility patents as patents issued for the invention of a new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or a new and useful improvement thereof, it generally permits its
owner to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention for a period of up to twenty years from
the date of patent application ling. Approximately 90% of the patent documents issued by the USPTO in
recent years have been utility patents.
17Appendix Table A1 contains detailed descriptions of the specic data elds used in our study.
12Panel B).18
4 Results
4.1 Ability to Pay for Monetary Damages
We begin by testing the central prediction of our model; namely, that NPEs target rms
with the ability to pay large damages or settlement fees. We use both level of cash balances
(CashLevel) on the balance sheet and changes in cash holdings (CashShock) as proxies for
the potential proceeds of a suit (! from Section 2). We include several rm- and time-level
control variables, such as the rm's market value, book-to-market ratio,19 prior year's stock
market performance, and number of recent patent lings, along with time and rm xed
eects. In Table II, we report OLS regression results of the following specication:
SuedByNPE = f(TotalAssets;MarketValue;BM;PastReturn;PatentStock;CashLevel;CashShock):
The outcome variable, SuedByNPE, is a dummy equal to 1 if the rm was litigated by an
NPE in a particular year. CashLevel is the total amount of cash reported on the balance
sheet as of the beginning of the previous scal year. CashShock is a dummy variable equal
to 1 if the change in cash in the most current scal year, compared to the previous scal year's
cash level, is among the top 90% of cash changes in the cross-section. We include rm xed
eects to capture unobserved rm-level time-invariant factors that are correlated with NPE
targeting. Likewise, we include time xed eects to control for variation in litigation activity
specic to a given year and for any time trends in litigation propensity. We report various
specications to show the incremental value of each covariate on overall model t. Column 5
of Table II represents our preferred specication, which includes rm-level characteristics
18As a docket (case) can have multiple defendants and the same defendant can be sued multiple times in a
year, the rm-years presented in Panel B encompass our 3,683 cases.
19We use Tobin's Q to proxy for investment opportunities.
13(market value, book-to-market ratio, asset size, prior stock performance of equity), time and
rm xed eects, and our cash variables. We use a log transformation of all variables to
minimize the eect of outliers.20 We cluster our standard errors at the rm level in order to
broadly allow for any time-series dependency in the probability of being sued over the course
of the sample period.
Table II provides strong evidence consistent with the model's central prediction; namely,
rms with large cash balances and rms experiencing a shock to their cash holdings are more
likely to be targeted by NPEs. For instance, controlling for other determinants and for rm
and time xed eects, the CashLevel coecient in Column 3, 0:1046 (t = 6:79), is large
and signicant, as is the CashShock coecient in Column 4, 0:0167 (t = 1:99). To get an
idea of the magnitudes, we use the coecient estimates in the full specication in Column 5.
With the average rm-level cash holding of $0.30 billion, the 0:1063 (t = 6:84) coecient
on CashLevel implies that a one standard-deviation increase in cash balance increases the
chances of being sued by 11.10%. Given that the unconditional probability of being sued
for patent infringement is approximately 2.18%, this is more than ve times the risk that
the average rm faces. The coecient on CashShock, 0:0213 (t = 2:55), implies that the
probability of being sued nearly doubles after a cash shock. Both of these estimates show the
large economic impact of cash on NPE targeting.
In terms of control variables, the probability of being sued by an NPE is positively
correlated with the level of R&D activity, as measured by the number of patents lings in
the past ve years (0:0064, t = 2:68). Once we include rm xed eects and control for
CashLevel, we nd that rms with smaller market capitalization are slightly more likely to
be targeted by NPEs ( 0:0049, t = 2:17).
In sum, Table II reveals the strong impact of cash on NPEs' targeting decisions. In
particular, in Column 5, both of these eects are estimated including rm and time xed
eects, along with ne controls for rm size, past returns, and patent stock. Thus, the large
20Neither the magnitudes nor the signicance of our coecients change appreciably when we do not use
log transformation (see Online Appendix).
14coecients can be interpreted as showing that a rm is likely to be targeted by NPEs when
it has an abnormally high cash level (or a shock to that cash level) relative to all other rms'
relative cash levels (and shocks).
4.2 Probability of Paying
A United States inventor's patenting process begins with an application to the United States
Patent and Trademark Oce, which assigns it to a patent examiner, whose job is to compare
its claims to prior art in order to determine whether the claimed invention is novel and
nonobvious.21 If the examiner decides to grant the claims in the application, USPTO issues
a patent to the applicant.22 The patentability of a patent's claims can be challenged in
administrative proceedings before USPTO. Patent validity can be challenged in one of the 94
federal district courts by presenting a prior art that may have been overlooked by USPTO
examiners.
Since a patent confers the right to exclude others from \practicing" an invention, patent
owners can sue anyone who uses, makes, sells, oers to sell, or imports their inventions
without legal permission. If a patent infringement lawsuit is not dismissed in its initial stages,
it proceeds to the discovery phase, in which both the accused infringer (defendant) and
the patent owner (plainti) supply documents intended to demonstrate how the allegedly
infringing product is made. If a party does not make or sell products or provide services
based on the patented invention, then it is likely to have far fewer documents to disclose.
Consequently, as NPEs do not produce products, going into the discovery phase can be far
less costly for them than for defendants.
If an infringement suit is not settled during the discovery phase, the judge interprets the
parties' claims, making a determination as to whether the patent is found both valid and
21Prior art refers to other patents, publications, and publicly disclosed but unpatented inventions that
predate the patent application's ling date.
22In 2013, the average time between application and initial examiner report was 18.2 months and, on
average, it took 29.1 months for USPTO to issue a patent. For other USPTO-related statistics, see
http://www.uspto.gov/about/stats/.
15infringed. A judge who rules in favor of the patent owner can award monetary damages
and/or issue an injunction to prohibit further infringement.
Our model suggests that NPEs will be opportunistic in picking patents to litigate,
maximizing the expected protability of winning. Our results in Section 4.1 show that NPEs
target the rms against which litigation will be most protable conditional on lawsuit success.
In this section, we show moreover that NPEs are most likely to target rms against which
they have a high probability of winning (either through settlement or in court).
We introduce two measures of an NPE's ex ante probability of success in litigation (p).
The rst is based on the idea that rms dier in their readiness to stave o litigation events.
Firms anticipating litigation are more likely to show evidence of advanced preparation; such
defense mechanisms are likely to deter NPEs because they stand to prolong the court (or
settlement) process. We use the number of \excess lawyers" as our measure of litigation-
readiness. Because the number of lawyers can vary with respect to rm characteristics, we
rst build a model to estimate the number of lawyers a rm would employ given its observable
characteristics. Specically, we regress (log) NumberOfLawyers on rms' intellectual property
holdings (log(PatentStock)) and on the presence of in-house counsel (In-HouseCounsel), a
department of lawyers housed inside the rm who handle its most frequent legal issues.
Firms performing badly in equity markets have been found to be slightly more likely to be
sued (Dyl, 1999; Simmons and Hoyt, 1993; Gande and Lewis, 2009); hence, we include past
performance. Finally, we include (a) rm xed eects to capture time-invariant unobserved
rm-level characteristics that can be related to NumberOfLawyers and (b) year xed eects
to capture variation in demand for lawyers over time.
Appendix Table A2 shows the results of the model we estimate to predict the expected
number of lawyers a rm hires, given covariates. As expected, the number of lawyers is
negatively correlated with past equity return and positively correlated with R&D activity, as
measured by PatentStock. We calculate ExcessLawyers by subtracting the predicted number
of lawyers from the actual number of lawyers. We take ExcessLawyers as a measurement of
16potential deterrence to NPEs; in principle, it decreases the probability of success an NPE
can expect in targeting a given rm.
Our second measure uses the within-rm resource constraint on time and proceeds spent
battling litigation. Based on this, we predict that a rm is likely to focus less attention on
the marginal case if it is already occupied with other types of litigation. We therefore use the
existence of non-IP-related litigation (OngoingCases) as a measure of an NPE's likelihood of
targeting a rm, since rms dealing with such litigation may be more likely to settle or less
focused in court. A lack of focus in court would, in turn, give NPEs, holding all else xed, a
higher subjective probability of winning.
Using these two measures, we test our model's prediction that, conditional on the potential
proceeds if the NPE wins a given suit (!, in our model), NPEs should target rms that
oer a higher ex ante probability of a successful litigation outcome. We supplement our main
specication (as reported in Table III) with the two measures of ex ante probability of suit
success:
SuedByNPE = f(TotalAssets;MarketValue;BM;PastReturn;PatentStock;CashLevel;
CashShock;ExcessLawyers;OngoingCases):
The results of these tests are reported in Table III. The coecient estimate on ExcessLawyers
is negative ( 0:1295, t =  2:31), consistent with a deterrent eect of a large legal team. The
coecient implies that a one standard-deviation increase in excess lawyers is associated with a
0.5% decrease in the chance of being targeted by an NPE. The coecient on OngoingCases is
positive and signicant. Given the rm xed eects, that coecient|0:0167 (t = 2:87) from
Column 4|implies that when a rm has a slate of ongoing cases, it has a 1.67% higher chance
of being targeted by an NPE (against a mean of roughly 2%), controlling for CashLevel and
CashShock. Overall, these results suggest that NPEs target rms a with higher likelihood of
settling.
17Of course, the true prediction of our model is the overall expected protability of targeting
a given rm: the product of ! (proceeds) and p (probability of winning). Empirically, this
equates to the interaction between our measures of proceeds (CashLevel and CashShock)
and of probability of success (ExcessLawyers and OngoingCases). In Table IV, we test the
impact of overall expected protability using these interaction eects. The specication is
identical to that used in Tables II and III, with the dependent variable being whether or not
the given rm was targeted by litigation from an NPE.
The interpretation of each measure in Columns 1-4 is that NPEs are signicantly more
likely to bring suit as the ex ante expected total protability of bringing litigation increases.
The negative and signicant coecient on (CashLevel ExcessLawyers) implies that NPEs are
especially likely to target a rm with a high cash level and a small legal team. The positive
and signicant coecients on (CashLevel  OngoingCases) and (CashShock  OngoingCases)
similarly indicate that NPEs are especially likely to target a rm that is ush with cash and
busy with other cases.23
The sum of the evidence in Tables II-IV provides strong support for the main predictions
of our model of endogenous patent troll formation. In particular, the evidence suggests that
NPEs are behaving precisely as patent trolls would: They target rms that are ush with cash
(or that have had recent positive cash shocks), that lack broad legal teams, that are likely to
be busy with other cases, and that are from regions and/or industries with strong precedents
for successful patent litigation. In the following section, we strengthen this characterization
by exploring a particularly egregious NPE behavior: targeting cash that is entirely exogenous
to the patent claim.
23We also create a third measure of ex ante probability, using the evidence on judicial bias (Lerner, 2013)
and information on industrially and geographically similar recent case outcomes. We report the results in
Appendix Table A3, nding that when NPEs think they are more likely to win a suit against a rm (given
the geographic make-up of the court location vis- a-vis the rm, along with the recent track record of success
suing rms from that region and industry), they are signicantly more likely to bring the suit against the
rm|precisely when the rm is ush with cash.
184.3 Unrelated Prots
While the evidence presented in the previous section suggests that NPEs exhibit opportunistic
behavior in suing alleged patent-infringing rms, it does not suggest that they go after prots
unrelated to the patents that have allegedly been infringed. This is because rm-level data
do not allow us to extract infringed-patent-related prots from total prots. In this section,
we use business-segment disclosures to do exactly that.
This ne empirical specication also allows us to address an identication issue that
we could not address with the aggregated cash variables at the rm level. In particular,
although all of the results in Table II are consistent with the endogenous patent troll behavior
we model in Section 2, an alternative explanation could be that the targeted rms have
endogenously realized that they are infringing on patents and have raised cash preemptively
as a precautionary savings device. But for this to explain all of our results thus far, rms must
raise cash (and have abnormal shocks to cash) precisely before they are sued, controlling for
the amount of R&D activity in which they have engaged. More importantly|and directly|
from Tables III and IV, we see that under this interpretation, rms would need to raise cash
for precautionary savings to preempt litigation at the same time they are actively decreasing
their legal representation. This seems counter to the preemptive cash-stockpiling thesis.
Instead, our ndings are much more consistent with NPEs acting as patent trolls|targeting
cash-rich rms that have recently reduced their legal teams.
We are able to provide even cleaner empirical evidence for patent troll behavior using nely
reported business-segment data. As of 1976, all rms are required by Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards (SFAS) 14 (Financial reporting for segments of a business enterprise,
1976) and SFAS 131 (Reporting desegregated information about a business enterprise, 1998)
to report nancial information for any industry segment that accounts for more than 10% of
total annual sales.
Using these segment-level lings, we extract information on industry classication, sales,
and cost of goods sold for each segment for all conglomerates between 2000 and 2011. We
19then use the concordance between international patent classication (IPC) codes and four-
digit United States Standard Industrial Classications (SIC) to identify the conglomerates'
segments associated with the NPE-litigated patents.24
After identifying segments related to allegedly infringed patents, we split each NPE-
targeted rm's segments into related segments and unrelated segments. A rm's related
segments are those segments that could potentially use the litigated patent in regular
operations. Its unrelated segments could not. We compute each segment group's gross prots
by subtracting cost of goods sold from segment group sales.25
We note that not all conglomerates report segment-level information in the same format.
For example, a conglomerate may report information on one segment only, or it may report
cost of goods sold for only one of the segments in which it operates. Therefore, our nal
sample contains only conglomerates for which we have both cost and revenue data on at least
one related and one unrelated segment.
We estimate a model to test whether the probability of being sued by an NPE is correlated
with prots obtained from unrelated segments, even after controlling for the protability
of related segments. In this model, we include conglomerate xed eects to control for
conglomerate-level unobserved litigation probability. We also control for industry-wide shocks
in protability by including a variable measuring the average protability of the segment's
industry.
The results of our segment-level analysis are shown in Table V. Column 1 shows the
basic model, while Column 2 includes conglomerate xed eects. Both columns tell the
same story. As one would expect, RelatedSegmentProtability is a large and signicant
predictor of being targeted by NPEs, consistent with the results in Tables II-IV. But so is
UnrelatedSegmentProtability, with nearly the same magnitude and signicance. In other
24The concordance le we use was developed by Silverman (2002) and later improved by Kerr (2008). This
concordance has been used in several other studies, including those of McGahan and Silverman (2001) and
Mowery and Ziedonis (2001).
25While we would ideally prefer to measure cash at the segment level in order to make our segment-level
analysis completely analogous to the tests in Tables II-V, segment-level cash variables are not reported. Thus,
we use protability (revenues net of costs) at the segment level to proxy for protability of suit.
20words, NPEs seem not to care where their proceeds come from; an NPE's probability of
suing a rm increases with the rm's prots even if those prots are derived from segments
exogenous to the patent under litigation. In Column 2, we see that the coecient on
UnrelatedSegmentProtability, 0:0051 (t = 2:96), implies that, controlling for the protability
of a segment related to the patent allegedly being infringed, a one standard-deviation increase
in a completely unrelated segment's protability increases the chance of being sued by 0.8%
(relative to a mean of 1.8%). This compares to an increase in probability of 1% for the same
size increase in a related segment's protability (t = 2:95).
In sum, the results in Table V provide additional, and perhaps even stronger, evidence
that NPEs behave as patent trolls.
4.4 IP Litigation Behavior of Practicing Entities (PEs)
Non-practicing entities do not have a monopoly on IP litigation. Practicing entities (PEs)
also sue each other for patent infringement. If our results were simply picking up general
characteristics of IP litigation, then we might expect to see PEs behaving in much the same
way as NPEs. In order to compare PE and NPE behavior, we hand-collected the universe of
patent infringement cases brought by PEs against other PEs in the same period (2001-2011).
The time-series of PE litigation presented in Appendix Table A4 shows that PE litigation
has no time-series trend; it has remained sTable at roughly 150 cases per year. NPE litigation,
in contrast, has seen huge growth during the same period (included in Appendix Table A4
for comparison).
We run a more formal analysis of the determinants of PE lawsuits, using a set-up identical
to that used for NPEs in Section 4.1. We replicate the specications used in Table III, but
this time we use SuedByPE as the dependent variable.26 The results of this analysis are
in Table VI, where we see that PEs behave very dierently from NPEs. Nearly all of the
predictors of NPE litigation behavior have a small and insignicant impact on PE litigation
26SuedByPE is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the rm is involved in a PE IP lawsuit in that year, and 0
otherwise.
21behavior. Moreover, the impact of cash goes mildly in the opposite direction|PEs tend to
sue rms with slightly lower cash levels|as does the impact of OngoingCases|PEs tend to
sue rms with fewer ongoing cases.
Our comparison suggests that our results on NPE litigation behavior are not just reections
of general characteristics of IP litigation. Rather, our ndings are consistent with agent-
specic motivations for NPEs in targeting rms ush with cash just when favorable legal
outcomes are more likely.
5 Impact of Patent Trolling on Real Outcomes
Our results up to this point suggest that NPEs behave as patent trolls in their litigation
behavior. They target rms opportunistically|not on the merits of the case but rather
on the ease of extracting rents. Our model predicts that this leads to socially inecient
outcomes, both when rms decide not to pursue protable innovations because it is ex ante
more protable to be a troll and when rms that would otherwise invent/commercialize decide
not to, given the high likelihood of being litigated. Furthermore, in terms of comparative
statics, the higher the expected cost of litigation to an innovating rm, the less likely that
rm is to innovate and commercialize.
It is dicult to measure the potential innovation that NPE behavior has stied. Never-
theless, we seek to obtain at least a baseline estimate of how NPEs aect innovative behavior.
To do this, we adopt a di-in-di approach.
We compare all rms targeted by NPEs. In this subsample, rms are identical in terms
of NPEs' target-selection criteria. We separate targeted rms according to whether (1) they
were forced to pay out to NPEs (they lost in court or settled) or (2) the cases against them
were dismissed. We then test whether losing a case and having a case dismissed lead rms
in dierent directions in terms of future R&D productivity. Specically, we focus on how
R&D expenditures on new projects dier (pre- and post-litigation) among the two classes of
22targeted rms. In addition, for the same di-in-di set, we examine the eect on tangible
outcomes such as additional patents and citations to those patents.
We use rm-level patent information from the database used by Kogan et al. (2012) to
analyze two outcomes: the change in the annual ow of rm-level patents (as measured by
new patent applications) and the change in the number of patent citations.27 These outcome
variable choices are motivated by a large past literature studying the eciency and outcomes
of innovation.28
Table VII reports the results of a treatment eects model in which we compare the outputs
of (1) rms that were forced to pay out to NPEs (they lost in court or settled) and (2)
rms that managed to have their cases dismissed. These two types of rm are interesting to
compare because they match up in terms of attractiveness for NPE targeting, but one pays
the tangible costs of litigation whereas the other pays nothing.29
Our sample contains 484 observations (events), of which thirty-ve were dismissed. We
note that a rm may be sued multiple times in a given year; if at least one of those cases
was not dismissed, we classify the event in the \not dismissed" category. After matching
rms using our treatment eects model, we compare rms with dismissed cases to rms that
lose cases in terms of future patent accumulation and of citations to patents before and after
the litigation event. While the pre-litigation trends in patent accumulation, citations, and
R&D expenditures are identical across groups, we see striking dierences following litigation.
27The database, constructed using Google Patents (www.google.com/patents), is made up of all utility
patents issued by USPTO between January 1, 1926 and November 2, 2010. We choose to use the Kogan et al.
(2012) database over the frequently used NBER U.S. Patent Citations Data File for two reasons: (1) The
NBER database ends at the end of 2005 and NPE litigations have become more intensive in recent years
and (2) the Kogan et al. (2012) database is more comprehensive in terms of the number of patents it can
attribute to public rms. (Table 1 of Kogan et al. (2012) suggests that they were able to match 24% more
patents than NBER.)
28See, for example, Griliches (1981, 1984), Pakes (1985), Jae (1986), Griliches, Pakes, and Hall (1987),
Connolly and Hirschey (1988), Griliches, Hall, and Pakes (1991), Hall (1993a), Hall (1993b), and Hall, Jaee,
and Trajtenberg (2005), showing that patents (and patent citations) are indications of R&D productivity.
29From Panel A of Table VII, two signicant predictors of dismissed cases are (a) CashShock and (b)
TotalAssets. While statistically signicant, the economic magnitude of their predictability is small. This can
be seen through the low R2 of the predictive model, most of which is coming from the year xed eects.
Further, the two groups of NPE-targeted rms appear otherwise ex ante to be quite similar on observable
characteristics.
23Specically, in the years following litigation, rms against whom cases are dismissed produced
spent on average $211 million (t = 1:96) more on R&D expenditures than rms that lost to
NPEs. These rms also spent on average $49 million more (t = 2:95) to acquire more in
process R&D from outside.30 Furthermore, in the years following litigation, rms against
whom cases are dismissed produced 63.52 more new patents (t = 2:96), and these new patents
received 723.98 more citations (t = 3:45), relative to the group of rms that suered the cost
of NPE litigation.31 These large dierences in R&D expenditure, patent production and in
the quality of produced patents do not appear until after NPE litigation.
As a placebo test to conrm that this result is driven by the NPE litigation action and
not by a general decline in the losing rms' technological patent portfolios (relative to those
of the rms whose cases were dismissed),32 we also compare new citations to the vintage
patent portfolios (patents obtained before the litigation event) for the two sets of rms. If the
decline in innovation is acting solely through the NPE litigation, we should see no dierence
in citations to these patent portfolios, even after the litigation event. This is precisely what
we nd in Panel C of Table VII.
In all, the evidence in this section strongly supports the idea that NPEs have a real and
negative impact on innovation for United States rms.
6 Discussion
We document transfers from PEs to NPEs that appear to substantively reduce PEs' innovative
activity. To measure NPEs' net impact on innovation, however, we must also consider the
30Prior to 2009 (i.e. before eective date of SFAS 142R) , General Accepted Accounting Principles required
research and development assets acquired in a business combination that have no alternative future use to be
measured at their acquisition-date fair values and then immediately charged to expense.
31We focus on the two years following the initial ling of the litigation, as the time between ling date
and initial discovery phase could be up to a year. Also, because the distributions of the outcome variables
(change in patents, change in citations, change in expenditures for R&D) contain extreme observations, we
also redo the analysis winsorizing and excluding extreme observations using cuto points (suggested by
Cook's distance). The magnitudes remain signicant and of comparable magnitude.
32For instance, it might be that the rms against whom cases were dismissed happen to have more
commercializable technology (such as wireless remote technology), while the losing rms have a patent
portfolio in decline (such as wired hard-cable).
24possibility that litigation proceeds ow back to end-inventors. That said, estimates are
that only ve cents of every dollar in damages paid by PEs to NPEs makes it back to the
end-innovator (Bessen et al., 2014). Thus, one would need to believe in a huge multiplier
on this transfer (on the order of 2000%) to justify, from a social-welfare perspective, NPE
litigation practices as an ecient transfer of the marginal dollar of innovative capital. In
addition, the small size of NPEs' transfers to end-innovators also aects the proposed positive
incentive eects of NPEs in the policing of patent infringement. If potential innovators are
disincentivized from the marginal innovative project because they believe that large, well-
funded organizations might infringe on their patents, the prospect of receiving (through NPE
lawsuits) ve cents of every dollar of the innovation's value would do little to re-incentivize
them.
7 Conclusion
We provide the rst large-sample evidence on the litigation behavior of NPEs. We show
precisely which corporations NPEs target, when NPEs litigate, and how NPE litigation
impacts the innovative activity of targeted rms. We build a parsimonious model of an
innovative economy to better understand NPEs' roles, incentives, and welfare impact. We
present strong empirical evidence supporting the model's main predictions: NPEs behave,
on average, as patent trolls. NPEs target rms that are ush with cash or that have
just had positive cash shocks. NPEs even target conglomerate rms that earn their cash
from segments having nothing to do with their allegedly infringing patents. Protability in
unrelated businesses is almost as predictive of an NPE suit as is protability in business
segments related to NPE-alleged patent infringement. Additionally, NPEs target rms they
expect are more likely to lose in litigation (either in court or through settlement). NPEs
target rms that are tied up with litigation outside of the intellectual property space and
rms that have abnormally small legal teams. Lastly, we nd that the litigation behavior of
25NPEs has negative real consequences on innovation activity. In particular, after losing to
NPEs in court, targeted rms innovate less and have lower-quality innovations.
The stakes of how to organize intellectual property disputes are massive. If the United
States becomes a less desirable place to innovate because NPEs are left unchecked, innovation
and human capital|and the returns to that innovation and human capital|will likely ee
overseas. That said, innovators will also leave if they feel they are not are protected from
large, well-funded interests that might infringe on innovative capital without recourse. Our
results provide evidence that NPEs do not protect innovators from large interests. Rather,
our results are consistent with the view that, on average, NPEs behave as patent trolls that
chase cash and negatively impact future innovation. Given our ndings, the marginal policy
response should be to more carefully limit the power of NPEs or, in the framework of our
model, increase the cost of bringing suit against commercializers of innovative ideas.
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31Table I. Summary Statistics, 2001 - 2011
Appendix Table A1 contains the deﬁnitions of the variables we use. Panel A of this table presents
summary statistics on the ﬁrms included in the tests. Panel B tabulates the number of ﬁrms by
incidence of being subject to a litigation ﬁled by an NPE.
Panel A. Summary Statistics on Firm Characteristics
Mean Median St. dev P05 P25 P75 P95
Market Value 4050.06 338.44 17294.53 13.21 76.76 1491.83 16468.02
Total Assets 10.39 0.52 83.90 0.02 0.11 2.23 25.27
Book to Market 0.70 0.55 0.65 0.12 0.32 0.86 1.72
Past Return 0.13 0.05 0.63 -0.70 -0.22 0.34 1.20
Number of Law Firms 0.66 0.00 4.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00
Cash Shock 0.04 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Patent Stock 11.86 0.00 112.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 22.00
In-house Counsel 0.03 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ongoing Cases 0.18 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Cash Level 0.31 0.02 1.83 0.00 0.01 0.09 1.00
Panel B. Number of Firms Sued by Non-practicing Entities (NPEs)
Year Sued by NPE Total Firms
2001 11 5,607
2002 43 5,375
2003 48 5,402
2004 70 5,067
2005 85 4,959
2006 142 4,761
2007 235 4,709
2008 186 4,548
2009 230 4,412
2010 328 4,356
2011 336 4,231
Total 1,714 53,427Table II. Cash and Probability of Being Sued
In this table, we use OLS regression to estimate the probability of being sued by an NPE. The
outcome variable, Sued by NPE, is a dummy equal to 1 if the ﬁrm was litigated by an NPE that
year. Total Assets of the ﬁrm are as of the end of the previous ﬁscal year. Market Value of the
equity is measured as of the end of the previous ﬁscal year. Book-to-market ratio (B/M) is the
ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity as of the end of the previous ﬁscal year.
Book value of equity is calculated as sum of stockholders equity (SEQ), Deferred Tax (TXDB),
and Investment Tax Credit (ITCB), minus Preferred Stock (PREF). Past Return is the 12-month
return prior to ﬁscal year end. Patent Stock is the number of patents the ﬁrm applied for in the
past ﬁve years. Cash Level is the amount of cash reported on the balance sheet as of the beginning
of the previous ﬁscal year. Cash Shock is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the change in cash in the
current ﬁscal year compared to that of the previous ﬁscal year is among the top 90 percentile of
cash changes. We use log transformation for Total Assets, Market Value, B/M, Patent Stock, and
Cash Level. The sample contains ﬁrm-year observations between 2001 and 2011. Standard errors,
clustered by ﬁrm, are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical signiﬁcance at the
1, 5, and 10 percent levels.
Sued by NPE Sued by NPE Sued by NPE Sued by NPE Sued by NPE
Total Assets 0.0001** 0.0002** 0.0001* 0.0002** 0.0001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Market Value 0.0131*** -0.0014 -0.0046** -0.0016 -0.0049**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
B/M 0.0167*** 0.0246*** 0.0160*** 0.0246*** 0.0159***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Past Return 0.0023** -0.0008 -0.0011 -0.0009 -0.0012
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Patent Stock 0.0131*** 0.0075*** 0.0065*** 0.0075*** 0.0064***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Cash Level 0.1046*** 0.1063***
(0.015) (0.016)
Cash Shock 0.0167** 0.0213**
(0.008) (0.008)
Firm FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N5 3 , 4 2 05 3 , 4 2 05 3 , 4 2 05 3 , 4 2 05 3 , 4 2 0
R2 0.07 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42Table III. Probability of Being Sued and Ex-ante Loss Likelihood
In this table, we use OLS regression to estimate the probability of being sued by an NPE. The
outcome variable, Sued by NPE, is a dummy equal to 1 if the ﬁrm was litigated by an NPE that
year. Total Assets of the ﬁrm are as of the end of the previous ﬁscal year. Market Value of the
equity is measured as of the end of the previous ﬁscal year. Book-to-market ratio (B/M) is the
ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity as of the end of the previous ﬁscal year.
Book value of equity is calculated as sum of stockholders equity (SEQ), Deferred Tax (TXDB),
and Investment Tax Credit (ITCB), minus Preferred Stock (PREF). Past Return is the 12-month
return prior to ﬁscal year end. Patent Stock is the number of patents the ﬁrm applied for in the
past ﬁve years. Cash Level is the amount of cash reported on the balance sheet as of the beginning
of the previous ﬁscal year. Cash Shock is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the change in cash in the
current ﬁscal year compared to that of the previous ﬁscal year is among the top 90 percentile of cash
changes. Excess Lawyers is the residual number of lawyers left after deducting the model-estimated
number of lawyers (Appendix Table A2) from the actual number of lawyers with whom the ﬁrm
works. Ongoing Cases equals 1 if the ﬁrm was engaged in non-IP-related litigation that year. We
use log transformation for Total Assets, Market Value, B/M, Patent Stock, and Cash Level. The
sample contains ﬁrm-year observations between 2001 and 2011. Standard errors, clustered by ﬁrm,
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
levels.
Sued by NPE Sued by NPE Sued by NPE Sued by NPE
Total Assets 0.0001 0.0002* 0.0001 0.0002*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Market Value -0.0049** -0.0046** -0.0053** -0.0051**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
B/M 0.0159*** 0.0163*** 0.0145** 0.0149**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Past Return -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0012
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Number of Patents 0.0064*** 0.0063*** 0.0064*** 0.0062***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Cash Level 0.1063*** 0.1069*** 0.1052*** 0.1058***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
Cash Shock 0.0213** 0.0216*** 0.0214** 0.0217***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Excess Lawyers -0.1295** -0.1309**
(0.056) (0.056)
Ongoing Cases 0.0167*** 0.0169***
(0.006) (0.006)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N5 3 , 4 2 05 3 , 4 2 05 3 , 4 2 05 3 , 4 2 0
R2 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42Table IV. Total Proﬁtability and Being Sued by NPEs
This table reports a split-sample analysis using two dummies, Litigation and Ongoing Cases. The
outcome variable, Sued by NPE, equals 1 if the ﬁrm was litigated by an NPE that year. The
legend of Table III discusses the independent variables. The sample contains ﬁrm-year observations
between 2001 and 2011. Standard errors, clustered by ﬁrm, are reported in parentheses. ***, **,
and * denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.
Sued by NPE Sued by NPE Sued by NPE Sued by NPE
Total Assets 0.0002* 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Market Value -0.0058*** -0.0054** -0.0040* -0.0052**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
B/M 0.0138** 0.0145** 0.0161*** 0.0146**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Past Return -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.001 -0.0011
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Number of Patents 0.0064*** 0.0064*** 0.0062*** 0.0064***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Cash Level 0.1190*** 0.1055*** 0.0421** 0.1045***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016)
Cash Shock 0.0213** 0.0249*** 0.0223*** 0.0041
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010)
Excess Lawyers 0.0098 0 -0.001 -0.0011
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Ongoing Cases 0.0167*** 0.0167*** -0.002 0.0151***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Cash Level x Excess Lawyers -0.0267**
(0.011)
Cash Shock x Excess Lawyers -0.0086
(0.016)
Cash Level x Ongoing Cases 0.1086***
(0.024)
Cash Shock x Ongoing Cases 0.0352**
(0.018)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N5 3 , 4 2 05 3 , 4 2 05 3 , 4 2 05 3 , 4 2 0
R2 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42Table V. Probability of Being Sued: Related vs. Unrelated Cash
Flows
In this table, we report the probability of a conglomerate being sued by an NPE as a function of the
gross proﬁtability of related and unrelated segments. The unit of observation is a conglomerate-
segment-year. Sued by NPE is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the ﬁrm was litigated by an NPE that
year. To identify segments that are related to litigated patents, we use the IPC-to-SIC concordance
developed by Silverman (2002). We use ﬁnancial statements disclosed in segment ﬁlings to collect
segment-level information on sales and cost of goods sold and calculate segment proﬁtability as the
di↵erence. Industry Proﬁtability is the average proﬁtability of all ﬁrms in the same four-digit SIC.
Our sample includes all conglomerates, between 2001 and 2011, which had more than one segment
reporting proﬁtability data. Standard errors, clustered by ﬁrm, are reported in parentheses. ***,
**, and * denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.
Segment sued by NPE Segment sued by NPE
Related Segment Proﬁtability 0.0110** 0.0065***
(0.005) (0.002)
Unrelated Segment Proﬁtability 0.0110*** 0.0051***
(0.003) (0.002)
Industry Proﬁtability -0.0004*** 0.0001
(0.000) (0.000)
Conglomerate FE No Yes
N2 9 , 7 5 62 9 , 7 5 6
R2 0.02 0.37Table VI. Probability of Being Sued by a Practicing Entity (PE)
The outcome variable in this table, Sued by PE, is a dummy equal to 1 if the ﬁrm was litigated by
a PE that year. All independent variables are identical to those used and described in Table III.
The sample contains ﬁrm-year observations between 2001 and 2011. Standard errors, clustered by
ﬁrm, are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10
percent levels.
Sued by PE Sued by PE Sued by PE Sued by PE
Total Assets 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Market Value 0.002 0.0019 0.0023 0.0022
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
B/M 0.0009 0.0007 0.0017 0.0015
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Past Return -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0016 -0.0016
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Number of Patents 0.0011 0.0012 0.0011 0.0012
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Cash Level -0.0213** -0.0216** -0.0207** -0.0210**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Cash Shock 0.0071 0.0069 0.007 0.0069
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Excess Lawyers 0.059 0.0598
(0.041) (0.041)
Ongoing Cases -0.0093** -0.0094**
(0.004) (0.004)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N5 3 , 4 2 05 3 , 4 2 05 3 , 4 2 05 3 , 4 2 0
R2 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28Table VII. Real Outcomes
Panel A reports the probit estimates of a treatment e↵ects model to compare the number of RD
Expense, patent applications and the number of citations to those patents for two categories of
ﬁrms that have been targeted by NPEs: (1) ﬁrms that are litigated but get the case dismissed
and (2) ﬁrms that are litigated and lose the litigation. Panel B reports the di↵erence between new
patent applications (or citations to those patents), RD Expense (All), and RD Expense (Acquired)
one year before the litigation and one year after it. Panel C reports the di↵erence in new citations
to patent portfolios that were patented before the litigation. Standard errors, clustered by ﬁrm, are
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
levels.
Panel A. Probit (Dismissed vs. Lost by the Firm)
P(Dismissed)
P(Dismissed)
Total Assets 0.0013***
(0.000)
Market Value -0.0323
(0.081)
B/M -0.1984
(0.491)
Past Return -0.1136
(0.194)
Patents Stock 0.0121
(0.029)
Cash Level -0.2377
(0.199)
Cash Shock 0.4796**
(0.219)
Excess Lawyers -0.6314
(1.117)
Other Cases 0.3219
(0.203)
Year FE Included
N4 8 4
R2 0.086
Panel B. Treatment E↵ects Model
Sample Comparison Di↵erence z-stat
Sample Comparison Di↵erence z-stat
R&D Expense (All) Dismissed vs. Settled/ NPE Won 211.03** 1.96
R&D Expense (Acquired) Dismissed vs. Settled/ NPE Won 49.28*** 2.95
New Patents Dismissed vs. Settled/ NPE Won 63.65*** 2.96
Total Citations Dismissed vs. Settled/ NPE Won 723.98*** 3.45
Panel C. Placebo Test
Sample Comparison Di↵erence z-stat
Citations per patent for patents created before the litigation Dismissed vs. Settled/ NPE Won 0.35 1.21Figure 1. This ﬁgure provides a heatmap of IP Litigation by
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.Appendix Table A2: Measures of Likely Outcome and Excess
Lawyers
In Panel A, we measure the number of excess lawyers based on a model that predicts the number of
lawyers used by comparable ﬁrms. We regress log number of lawyers on (a) how much intellectual
property the ﬁrm possesses (log(Patent Stock)), (b) whether the ﬁrm has an in-house counsel (In-
house Counsel), a department of lawyers housed inside the ﬁrm to handle its most frequent legal
issues, (c) the most recent market performance of the ﬁrm’s equity, and (d) ﬁrm ﬁxed e↵ects. In
Panel B, we regress the outcome of patent litigation on our Likely Outcome proxy. The outcome
variable equals 1 if the case ended in favor of NPE or was settled out of court. The Likely Outcome
proxy combines two pieces of information. The ﬁrst piece is the probability of being sued in state
C if a ﬁrm from industry J is located in state F. To calculate this probability, we use the ratio of
the number of ﬁrms in industry J in state F sued in state C to the number of ﬁrms in industry J in
state F sued in all states prior to time t. The second piece of information is the ex ante probability
of an NPE winning the case due to an ethnicity bias in the juror pool. We capture the judicial bias
by an indicator variable that compares Asian ethnicity in state F and state C. Thus, our litigation
proxy takes the following form:
Likely Outcome(j,f,t)=
0
@
X
C6=F
n(j,C,t   1)
P
C0 n(j,C0,t  1)
1
A · 1(Asian(C) < Asian(F)).
Using this Likely Outcome proxy, we use OLS to report its correlation with favorable case outcomes
for NPEs.
Panel A. Estimating the Number of Excess Lawyers
Log (# of Lawyers) Log (# of Lawyers) Log (# of Lawyers) Log (# of Lawyers) Log (# of Lawyers)
Patent Stock 0.0989*** 0.0640***
(0.006) (0.004)
In-house Counsel 1.9238*** 1.8283***
(0.039) (0.036)
Past Return -0.0044*** -0.0049***
(0.001) (0.001)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N8 2 , 5 4 08 2 , 5 4 08 2 , 5 4 08 2 , 5 4 08 2 , 5 4 0
R2 0.03 0.11 0.4 0.03 0.44
Panel B. Validation of Likely Outcome Proxy
In favor of NPE In favor of NPE In favor of NPE
Likely Outcome 0.0964** 0.1275*
(0.049) (0.067)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes No
Industry FE Yes Yes No
Firm FE No No Yes
N1 7 , 3 6 81 7 , 3 6 81 7 , 3 6 8
R2 0.16 0.17 0.22Appendix Table A3: Probability of Being Sued and Likely Outcome
Measure
In this table, we run an analysis identical to that in Table IV, with all variables and regression
speciﬁcation detailed there. The additional variables of interest are Likely Outcome, described in
Appendix Table A2, and the interactions of Likely Outcome with Cash Level and Cash Shock.
Sued by NPE Sued by NPE
Total Assets 0.0001 0.0001
(0.000) (0.000)
Market Value -0.0052** -0.0054**
(0.002) (0.002)
B/M 0.0145** 0.0144**
(0.006) (0.006)
Past Return -0.0011 -0.0012
(0.001) (0.001)
Number of Patents 0.0064*** 0.0063***
(0.002) (0.002)
Cash Level 0.0816*** 0.1048***
(0.016) (0.015)
Cash Shock 0.0219*** 0.0055
(0.008) (0.009)
Excess Lawyers 0.0003 -0.0005
(0.007) (0.007)
Likely Outcome -0.0057* 0.0007
(0.003) (0.003)
Ongoing Cases 0.0166*** 0.0167***
(0.006) (0.006)
Cash Level x Likely Outcome 0.0645***
(0.023)
Cash Shock x Likely Outcome 0.0485**
(0.019)
Firm FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
N5 3 , 4 2 05 3 , 4 2 0
R2 0.42 0.42Appendix Table A4: Number of Firms Sued by Non-practicing
Entities (NPEs) vs. Practicing Entities (PEs), 2001-2011
Year Sued by NPE Sued by PE Total Firms
2001 11 142 5,606
2002 43 95 5,373
2003 48 148 5,401
2004 70 152 5,066
2005 85 141 4,959
2006 142 153 4,760
2007 235 177 4,709
2008 186 112 4,547
2009 230 122 4,412
2010 328 133 4,356
2011 336 156 4,231
Total 1,714 1,531 53,420